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An application for divorce, on the ground of desertion, must make ouL with'
reasonable certainty every element of the statutory cause, or no decree can be
granted.
The statute of Pennsylvania requires, moreover, that the application shah be
mnade "in sincerity and truth for the causes mentioned " and if the court be of
an opinion, on the evidence, that the libelant has not shown good faith in the
application, and that the acts complained of were the natural resn't of his own
management and scheming to that end, a decree will be refused.
Evidence of libelant's acts and conduct toward his wife is therefore admis.
sible to show his motives in the application.
Where husband and wife had been living together in their own house, and
during her absence (with his leave) he broke up the household, and notified her
that he had taken rooms at a boarding-house, which would be "ready for occupancy" at a certain time, and requested her to "have thefurniture belonging to
yon removed" from the former residence, "or give me such directions as may
be necessary about it," and she refused to join him at the boarding-house; in a
suit by him for a divorce on the ground of desertion, she was entitled to show
that his object was to force her to stay away from him, or to leave him if she
did join him. An offer to prove "a series of humiliating language and opprobrious epithets addressed to her in the presence of her servants," should have
been admitted, to show his motives, though it might not be sufficient to entitle
her to a divorce, or even to justify her in leaving him.
This case is to be distinguished from Ehbachv. Ehbach, 11 Harris 343, and
others which rule that if a wife deserts the habitation of her husband she is
only justified by such acts as would entitle her tea divorce. Here the husband
broke up the home, and never in goodfaithoffered her another.
Under the circumstancesof this case, a direction to the jurythat "-as to the suggestion that the libelant's object in breaking up the establishment was to effect
the separation, and to effect the desertion of his wife-this cannot be material, so long as he provided a home, which he offered her. Even if he
desired the separation, so long as he provided a home, and there was no consent on hiz part that she should stay from it, she was not justifledl In doing so
by apprehensions that she might not be so happy as she was at the old home,"
was error.
Special matters may be given in evidence under a general plea, without notice, where no notice is required by rule of court, and no demand for it is made
beforehand by the opposite party.

This was a libel for divorce by the husband on the ground
of desertion. The jury, under the instructions of the court
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below, found the fact of desertion, and the court entered a
decree, from which respondent appealed to this court. The
facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
Gulou, for appellant.
Northrop, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TaOMPSON, C. J.-One of the grounds for a divorce from the
bonds of matrimony containedinthe Act of 13th of March,1815,
is for willful and malicious desertion, and absence of one party
from the habitation of the other, without reasonable cause, for
the space, or during the period of two years. The applicant,
for a divorce on this ground must establish with sufficient certainty, each and every of these ingredients, as elements necessary to constitute desertion within the meaning of the act..
They all must co-exist in proof, or no decree can be granted.
Collusive applications for divorce are strictly forbidden by
the statute, and, in order to guard against them, any presumption that such is the case must be negatived in the outset by the oath of the party applying, setting forth that the
application is "not made out of levity, or by collusion, and for
the mere purpose of being freed and separated,
*
*
but in sincerity and truth for the causes mentioned in sai I
petition." Whatever, therefore, may be the grounds upona
which an application is made, the libellant must, by his or

her oath, make it appear to the court that for that cause, and
for that alone, a divorce is desired and claimed.
This is the applicant's primafacie case and it is m.ede out
when the petition is in form, and sworn to. But as in every
other proceeding in law or equity, this prima facie, case may
be overturned or disproved. It should be shown in any cas.that the application is not, in fact, based upon the grounds
stated, but that the causes set out are merely to a lva.ice a
scheme or trick to make out a technical case to sever the
bonds of matrimony, no court would permit the application to
be successful. It would be against law, justice and truth to do

so. Courts ought never to sever the marriage contract, but
where the application is made "in sincerity and truth," for th,.
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causes set forth, and no other, and fully sustained by testimony.
In this view of the law we think the learned judge below
pushed a principle, that may be all right in some cases, too
far when he said, in view of the evidence in this case, "that
as to the suggestion that the libelant's object in breaking up
the establishment (his house) was to effect the separation, and
effect the desertion of his wife-this cannot be material so
long.as'he provided a home, which he offered her. Even if he
desired the separation, so long as he provided a home, and
there was no consent on his part that she should stay from it,
she was not justified in doing so by apprehensions that she
might not be so happy as she was at the old home."
This view overlooked the testimony in the case in one important aspect, and prevented the jury from inferring from
it facts it was full of in another.
The alleged desertion of the respondent was attempted to
be established by proof that after the libelant had broken up
his home, in the absence of his wife, without consultation or
any knowledge of an intention to do so communicated to her,
she failed to go to quarters proffered to her at a boardinghouse. He was, in point of fact, the first to desert. It must
be remembered that he claims no desertion by proof against
his wife until after he had broken up their household establishment and left, and formally notified her to take possession
of her share of the household goods. Was she bound to
follow him if she had good reason to believe that his movements were solely with a view to force her to desert his habitation, and thus make a case for him? Washenot bound to
exhibit a case of good faith on his part, in order to be entitled,
to charge bad faith on hers? If the evidence was full to the
fact that he desired to get rid of his wife previous to his giving up housekeeping, and that all that he did afterward was
to consummate that design, was he entitled to be divorced?
Would that be a divorce applied for "in sincerity and truth?"
viz., for the desertion of his wife, if he had labored and
schemed to provoke that desertion? This cannot be, unles%
the necessity of possessing a good cause is no merit in divorce
22
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proceedings. But this charge of the learned judge deprivea
the libelant of the inferences from the testimony, that the
whole thing was concocted in fraud of the divorce laws; and
his notification of a room for her at a boarding-house was but
a part of a scheme to throw off the bonds into which he had
voluntarily entered, and which, from caprice or other cause,
had become annoying to him. She was entitled to such inference from the testimony, if legitimate, and this was for the
jury, but was forestalled by this view of the law.
There was no desertion from the habitation of the libelant
by the respondent, and in this respect the case is very differ.
ent from the cases cited to show that if a wife deserts the
habitation of her husband, or the husband turns a wife out
of doors, that such acts can only be justified by reasons which
would entitle the party to adivorce. Of this character are the
cases of Eshbach v. Eshbach, 11 Harris 343; Grove's Appeal,
1 Wr. 443, and Gcrton v. Gorton,12 Id. 226. Here the libelant left without any cause or reason, as disclosed to his wife.
The doctrine advanced was that she was bound to follow his
footsteps, notwithstanding every act might persuade her that
he did not desire her association as a wife. If she failed to
do so under such circumstances, after expressing herself entirely willing if he desired it, is willful and malicious deser.
tion to be inferred against her? By first leaving his habita"tion,he gave his wife the opportunity of showing why he did
it, and why and wherefore she did not follow; and if she could
show by his acts and declarations that he in fact did not desire her to follow and live with him, would such a failure necessarily furnish reason for an inference of willful and malicious
desertion from his bed and board? In Bishop v. Bishop, 6
0, 412, we held that willful and malicious desertion was not to
be inferred from a refusal on part of the wife to cross the
ocean and join a husband who had broken up their household
establishment and emigrated to America. We thought her
case entitled to be considered in the light of the difficulties
put before her by her husband voluntarily and without any controlling necessity, and that proof in addition to the absence
of the wife was necessary in order to estalblish the desertion
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to be of the character required by the Act of Assembly. We
gave her the advantage of the presumption of innocence until the contrary should be established. Had she deserted her
husband's habitation without reasonable cause before he left
England, a different case would doubtless have been presented.
So, indeed, would it have been in the case in hand. For it
has been held in the cases referred to, supra, that unless
turned out by her husband, or leaving him for causes which
would entitle her to a divorce, the desertion meant by the
Act of Assembly would be inferred-for the act gives this
effect to such absence without there be reasonable cause ;-and
reasonable cause has been settled to be, such cause as would
entitle to a divorce.
Although the wife in this case might not be justified to the
extent of being entitled to a divorce on account of the bad
faith of her husband in breaking up his establishment with a
design ultimately to force her to desert him. nor even to prevent
him from obtaining one if she persisted in refusing to rejoin
him if he desired her to do so in good faith, yet she might
undoubtedly show that all that had been done in breaking up
housekeeping by her husband was with a view to put himself into a position to claim a divorce from her, as a good reason why she did not follow him to become the victim of his
schemes. In such a condition of things, neither party could
claim a divorce-their case would not be within the Act of
Assembly. This sort of proof would be a mode of negativing
the charge of willful and malicious desertion. He could -not
claim a divorce based upon his own schemes to promote it.
To allow this would be to permit him to do what the law forbids-namely, to take advantage of his own wrong. We
think, therefore, the learned judge erred in the instructions
referred to, and which we need not further discuss.
We are also of opinion that the learned judge erred in
refusing the offer of respondent to prove a series of "humiliating language and opprobrious epithets addressed to her in
the presence of her servants."
This testimony should have been admitted as pertinent to
the question of. the motives of the libelant in breaking up
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his household establishment, and to show that the object of
the libelant in doing so was to force the respondent to refuse
joining him in a boarding-house, or to compel her to abandon
him in time if she did. This was her theory of his actions
and motives, and she was entitled to prove it if she could.
If a jury would be bound to infer this from the testimony, it
would present a case of fraud upon the law and upon the respondent, which ought and would prevent a divorce upon his
application.
I cannot see why fraud and chicanery are not to have the
effect to defeat a party practicing them, in an attempt to rescind the marriage contract, as well as in every other case;
yet it seems sometimes to be regarded as an exception to the
rule that fraud vitiates whatever it touches. Unless we regard
a wife as possessing "no rights which the law is bound to respect," we are bound to protect her against the fraud of her
husband when it may go to affect her dearest rights, as we
would against force and violence. If a scheme be disclosed to
get rid of a wife, by exposing her to insult before strangers,
until she shrinks from and abandons her persecutor, is he to be
rewarded by a recission of his marriage bonds, just as if he had
acted honestly, and she willfully and maliciously ? Verily, no.
She may defeat his unworthy attempts by showing that her
refusal to follow him was to avoid his schemes to get rid of her,
and not through willfulness and malice, with just the same
effect as if she had gone to him and suffered and endured, until
she could endure no longer. The testimony offered was a step
in the line of proof to show a scheme to get rid of the respondent, and when received: it might or might not have provedit.
just as the jury might determine. But it ought to have gone
to them. If fraud be admissible to be set up against such an
application, and we have said it is, then the testimony ought
to have been admitted on that ground. Great latitude of
proof is allowable in an issue of fraud, or where it may be
alleged and is material to be proved.
Notice of .the special matters to be given in evidence might
have been required from the respondent beforehand, but it
was not. And as there was no rule of court requiring it to
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be given, and no demand for it, we think the testimony was
not properly rejected for the want of it, as the learned judge
held.
This is about what we ruled in Brenig v. Brenig, 2 Casey
161. In Garrett v. Garrett, 4 Yates 244, a non-suit was
granted for want of notice of special matter, but with leave
to take it off, which was afterward done. It will be remembered that this was against thie libelant, whose libel was defective in specification. There was surprise in that case, in
offering new matter different from that disclosed by the libel.
Nothing like that appears to have been claimed here. We
think the want of notice of special matters not required by
rule of court, or by any special order, was not a ground for
refusing the evidence offered. It may be good practice to give
notice or to call for it; it saves controversy; but if neither
be done, it would be a peculiar case which would justify a
rejection of testimony on the Iround of want of notice, when
that is for the first time suggested in the midst of a trial.
Such we think was not this case. The reasons thus given as
to these two complaints of error are sufficient to require us
to reserve the decree of the court below.
Must we send the case back to be retried on the issue ?
We think not. When we inspect the record there was,
properly speaking, no issue in the case within the meaning
of the Act of Assembly. A jury seems to have been sworn to
try the case between the libelant and respondent, on the libel
and answer. But the Act of Assembly provides for a jury
only when either party shall desire any matter of fact, which
is affirmed by one party and denied by the other to be so tried.
That does not appear by the facts as presented to have been
the case. The jury were brought in seemingly as assistants
to the court, when they were really not necessary. The decree was by the court, on bill, answer and proof, and is here
on appeal and subject to be disposed as if no jury had sat in
the case. We will therefore dispose of the case as we conceive the merits under the evidence require.
We are of opinion, from a careful consideration of all the
testimony, and drawing all legal inferences from it, that the
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libelant is not entitled to claim a divorce from his wife. We
think it shows that the application was not made "in sincerity
and truth," for the causes set forth, viz., the desertion of the
wife; but that, that as a cause, so far as shown and claimed,
was the result of the management, scheming and colorable conduct of the applicant. We hold that where such coriduct ha.reacted on the conduct of the wife, so as to keep her absent
from her husband, who has left her and her abode, it necessarily meets the allegation of willful desertion, and deprives him
of the right to claim advantage of certain acts and conduct
which he has promoted and designed. As in all other cases
in equity, the applicant must be rectu in curia; have a good
cause, and the respondent a bad one. This must always be the
case where the divorce is resisted. The party who would win
in such a contest must be clear of everything which is charged
as a cause of separation against the opposite party.
We will refer to a few of the facts disclosed by the testimony, observing that no portion of it not noticed specially
does in the least, in our opinion, raise a counter current to that
produced by the facts to be noticed.
In the summer of 1866 the respondent being absent at Newport, with the assent of the libelant, he suddenly commenced
to break up his residence, and on being remonstrated with for
doing so by the respondent's father, he nade as an excuse the
statement that his establishment was too expensive for his
circumstances. To obviate this, Mr. Smith offered to undertake to defray all the expenses of his daughter, the respondent, and eventually proposed to pay rent for the house, in a
sum equal, as it turns out, to that for which the libelant
rented it to another party,viz., $2,000 per year. Met as to the
objection of expense the libelant declared in substance that
it was useless to insist on his keeping up the establishment,
"that they," meaning himself and wife, "could not live happily
together," exclaiming, "why don't she give me a divorce, or
grant me a divorce?" This, unexplained, cannot but be regarded as the key-note to all his after conduct.
He proceeded to break up the establishment, and on the 30th
of August, 1866, addressed to his wife, who had been absent
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-witr his consent, as already seen, for some time, the following
note :
"Mrs. Angier: I have taken rooms and board for you and
myself, at Mrs. Neils in's, N. W. corner of Broad and Locust
streets. On Monday next they will be ready for occupancy;
please have the furniture belonging to you removed from 2031
Walnut street (former residence), or give me such directions as
may be necessary about it. There are certain articles about
the house belonging tome which I will remove. Yours, truly."
To any mind, and especially a wife's, this meant separation,
if words mean anything. It was withdrawal on his part, and
a setting off her goods and chattels to her, as if it were no
longer intended that she was to live with him, with a personal
reclamation of his own from their joint possession, for his own
enjoyment and use. Their home was thus broken up, when its
occupancy might have been continued almost without expense,
and his wife notified in the coldest manner, of rooms taken,
and to be "ready for occupancy on Monday next." No one
could make out of this a desire on his part for the society of
his wife. She could read nothing but a wish for separation,
interpreted in the light of his impatienb exclamation of a desire
for a divorce, and the refusal of indemnity against expense by
his father-in-law, who was amply able to make it.good. This
offer she could hardly believe was refused from delicacy and a
disinclination to avail himselfofgratuitous supportfrom friends.
She must have known that he had been the recipient of very
large sums already from her father and brother, amounting in
the aggregate, as .his schedule in bankruptcy shows, to between
thirty and forty thousand dollars. The respondent replied to
this note within a day or two, and remonstrating against his
breaking up their home without knowledge or assent by her;
reminding him of past unkind treatment at home, and after all
this, desiring to take her to a boarding-house, "where," as she
says, "strangers might be witnesses to the treatment she had
been subject to;" she concluded by saying, "I intend returning (from Newport) on Saturday; ready to return to you whenever you express a wish to that effect, and provide a suitable
residence."
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Neither to the charges of bad treatment or the offer to return
did the libelant ever reply, either to assure her he wished her
to come to and live with him, or that he had procurea a proper
residence for her. She did not decline t,, join him, but wished
some sign or token that it was desired, and that a fit place was
provided. If he had desired her presence after having broken
up her home without consulting her, it was his duty to have
said so; but he did not, and in two days after her return to
the city, to the house of her brother, without a sign or a wish
that she should follow him, he charges desertion upon her. .
Without recapitulating the facts in proof further,.it is apparent, we think, that the boarding-house project was a scheme to
effect a separation. He rented his own house, in which they
had lived, for $2,000 per year, and took rooms at Mrs. Neilson's, at the rate of $2,000 a year. There was no great economy in this, especially as he was offered to be indemnified
against every expense of his wife at his old residence. It is
evident therefore he did not expect nor wish that his wife
should come to the boarding-house and live with him. This
seems plain from his whole conduct, but especially does it appear
from the testimony of Mrs. Neilson, of whom he engaged rooms.
She says "he engaged two rooms for himself and wife, with the
understanding that if she (his wife) went to Europe, his father
was to conie in her stead." Where this idea orignated of her
going to Europe we are not informed by the testimony, but are
obliged to presume that the rooms were not taken with any
intention of their ever bacoming the home of his wife. This,
and numerous other things in the testimony, show such an
apparent case of management and scheming on part of the libelant to provoke desertion on part of his wife, as acquits her of
the charge of willful and malicious desertion, and proves him
guilty of practicing such bad faith in exhibiting his bill for a divorce from the bonds of matrimony, as required the court below
to dismiss his bill as unfit, under the testimony, to be granted.
Considering the case on its merits, as we have done, we do not
find that the libelant has made out any such case of willful and
malicious desertion of the wife as is required in law to be the
foundation for a decree of divorce, but are constrained to con
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elude from the evidence, that whatever of desertion there was
in the case was brought about by the acts of the libelant himself, and that he is not entitled to the decree he seeks.
Decree of the court below is reverted, and the libelant's bill
is dismissed at his cost.
Among the causes of divorce which 13 Wiright, Pa., 249; Snith v. Smith,
have been established by statute in 12 X. 11. 81; Tidge v. Pidge, 3 Mete.
nearly all the American States, is 255; Stewart v. Stewart, 2 Sneed
"desertion," or, as it is sometimes 591; Rutledge vY..dedge,
5 Id. &4.
called, "abandonment" of the matri. .M;Cby v. JMcCby, 3 Ind., 55W. Evimonial habitation by either party for dence to show that the absence was
a certain period, varying in the seve- not willful desertion is, therefore, ad
ral States from one to lve years. The missible, as held in the principal case,
statutes usually require the desertion Word v. Word, 29 Ga., 281. In Aror.
to be " willful" or "malicious" (though rison v. Morrison, 20 Cal. 431, howIt is suggested that these words are ever, it was held that the intent to
implied in the ordinary as well as abandon may be inferred from the
the legal meaning of desertion), and fact of leaving without apparent
all describe substantially the same cause, and plaintiff need not show af
offense. It will be seen that the de- firmatively that there was no causecisions of the courts (to the principal none appearing the law will not preof which we shall refer) have estab- sume one.
lished a tolerably uniform construc2. As the absence must be willful
tion on the various points which have an agreement to separate is a bar to
divorce for desertion: Butler v. Butarisen.
1 The desertion must be wllful, ler, 1 Parsons 329; SoU v. SctU,
or, in other words, it must be deser- Wright 469; Mansfield v. Mansfleld;
tion, not mere absence. Thus in Free- Id.
284; Jones v. Jones, 13 Ala.
land v. .- eeland, 19 Mo. 354, GAx- 145; Crow v. Crow, 23 Ala. 5M3,
BrF, J., said: "When
absence of Simpson v. Simpson, 31 Mo. 24; Van
either party is charged by the other Voorhees v.
Van Voorhees, Wright
as a ground for dirvorce, it must be 630. So also is consent to the sepasuch as the statute makes a cause of ration though it may not amount to
divorce," and an allegation that the an actual agreement or any course of
wife left "without any cause what- conduct naturally calculated to pro.
ever, and has been absent for more duce It. Thus in Crow v. Crow, 23
than two years," was held Insufficient, Ala. 583, the husband deserted his
as it should have been averred that wife, but shortly after sent a third
the continuance was without cause. person to ner to see if the difficulties
It is generally held, therefore, that could not be settled, and she replied
the full ingredients of willful and ma- that she "had made up her mind not
This
licious desertion must be averred and to live with him any longer."
proved affirmatively:
Jennings v. was held to be such evidence of conJennings, 2 Beasley 238; Cook v. sent to the separation as to bar her
Obo, Id. 263; Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, application for divorce. See also

34 6

ANGIER V. ANGIER.

M29; his former house, put up a placard
Butler v. Buler, 1 Parsons
Gray . Gray, 15 Ala. 779; McCbr- "to let," and told his wife and daugh.
mick v. McCormick 19 Wis. 172, and ter to pack up their things, and he
would send a carriage to take them
Lea v. Lea, 8 Allen 418.
. So it has been held that such to his home. At the same time he
conduot on the part of the husband told his wife that she need not expect
as forces the wife to leave him is not any happiness, for she would have
only a bar to his application for di- none; he would take his family
vorce on the ground of desertion, but where he pleased-to Europe or to
Is in fact a desertion by him. " If," Illinois; they must go where he said
said BAuTOL, J., in Levering v. Lev- and see whom liepleased; none of
ering, 16 Md. 213, ' a man fails to their friends should come to see them:
supply his wife with such nesessaries if they did he would shoot them on
and comforts of life as are within his the spot, etc. The wife refused to go.
have considreach, and by cruelty compels her to DEILL, J., said: "We
quit him and seek shelter and protec- ered with care what was then said,
tion elsewhere, we should have no and our conclusion is, that what was
hesitation in saying it would be as said by the husband on that occasion
much an abandonment of her by hka completely disproves any sincere wish
as if he had deserted her and gone that his wife and daughters should
away himself." To the same effect remove to his residence to live with
Wood, 5 Iredell M;
are Wood v.
Morris v. .Morris, 20 Ala. 168; CamP
v. Camp, 18 Texas 528; Fellows v.
Fellows, 31 Me. 342; SyIkes v. Hal-

him. It was a fornma request to them
to go to his house, but it was accompanied with such threatening language and such unreasonable claims

upon them as were calculated, and as
nead, 1 Sandf. 483.
It was mainly upon these grounds it seems to us must have been dethat the breaking up of his house- signed, to prevent their removal," and
hold was rather an act of desertion he was held liable for necessaries supby the libelant than by his wife, and plied.
that his conduct showed that in %Isix. So in Fishli v. Fishli, 2 Littell 337,
cerity and truth" he consented to her the husband deserted the wife shortly
after marriage, and avowed his intenabsence, that the principal case was
tion not to live with her any more.
decided; and assuming the inferences
She moved to another State in search
to be correctly drawn from the facts
of employment. Shortly before the
to
(as indeed there appears no reason
statutory period of divorce had
doubt), the decision is in entire harelapsed, he wrote her a letter, offermony with the course of the Ameriing to support her in his own house
case
similar
A
very
can authorities.
or elsewhere, hut not indicating any
in its circumstances though the queschange in his purpose not to treat her
tion was not as to divorce, but as to
as his wife. The court said: "Nor
for
necessaries
liability
husbands
the
do we think the offer made in the
furnished the wife, was Walker v.
letter he exhibits, of supporting hex
that
In
Laghton, 11 Foster 111
in his own house or elsewhere, calon.
case the husband left his family, and
went to reside in another house with lated to defeat her right to a divorce.
his mother. Subsequently he went to The letter is dated a few weeks before
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tne lapse of two years from the time
lie had left her; and If the offer had
been of a character and made in a
manner which she ought to have accepted, it would have been entitled to
great consideration, if not to conclusive effect. * * * The offer was
not to live with her in the relation of
husband and wife, and she was not
bound to accept an offer to stand in
any other relation. But the manner
in which the offer was made is no less
objectionable than the matter of it.
The whole circumstances, in fact
evince that the offer was made, not
with a sincere wish that it should be
accepted, but that in truth it was a
mere artifice, devised with the hope
of thereby defeating the right of complainant to a divorce, which, In the
lapse of a few week's would be complete." See also Gainwaters v. G11Unwaters, 28 Mo. 60, and Sykes v.
Halstead,1 Sandf. 483.
4. But a consent to the separation,
which appears to have been induced
by a desire of reconciliation and peace,
and to have been followed by efforts
to procure the absentee's return, will
not bar a decree for abandonment
LeavlU v. Leavitt, Wright 719.
5. But though there must be both a
separation and the intention to abandon, yet they need not be identical in
time of commencement. If one party
should leave the other on business or
by consent, for a time only, and should
afterward determine not to return,
the desertion would be held to commence from the time the intention to
abandon was formed: .Butler v. Butler, 1 Parsons 829; Fulton v. FuUon
36 Mi. 517; Xinkard v. Pinkard, 14
Tex. 358; Reed v. Reed, Wright 224.
In Conger v. Cbnger, 2 Beas. 286, a
contrary view seems to have been
taken, though perhaps nothing more
La meant to be decided than that the

subsequent change of intention would
not make the original separation a
desertion ab inilto, a decision entirely
in harmony with the other cases.
I. 1. The desertion must be not
only willful but continuous for the full
period prescribed by the statute, and
a return or a proper offer to return
within that time will be a bar to
a divorce: F tdon v. -zdton, 36 ML
517. And where the wife left the
husband, but returned and offered
to live with him, and he refused to
receive her and neglected to provide
for her, or give her permission to
return to his house for the statutory
period, the court held that this was
desertion by him, and made a decree
of divorce on her petition: Fellowsv
Fellows, 31 Me. 342; Grove's AppeaZ
1 WrIght, Pa. 443.
2. But the return or theoff er to
return must be in good faith, and
must be coupled with no improper or
unreasonable conditions or restrictions. Thus where the wife who had
left the husband went to his house
with some friends and offered to re.
turn and live with him, on condition
that a stepsoi t who had been forbidden
the house should be allowed to visit
her, it was held that such an offer was
not enough to terminate the desertion: I-uon v. Fulton, 36 Mi. 517.
So an offer to return on condition that
the husband's sister should not live
in the house was held bad: Hunbera
v. Hanbery, 29 Ala. 719; and in
Mc
7em v. .fcGahay, 31 Johns,
281, where the wife left the husband.
and after twelve years set a third
person to the husband to effect a re
conciliation, but refused to go herself
and the husband was not informed
that she requested or authorized the
application, and he refused to take her
back, it was held in an action for
board and lodging that he was not
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liable. bee also, McGwy v. WFit- Court of Pennsylvania held in Bishop
Uaim, 12 Johns. 993 (the same case v. Bishop, 6 Casey 412, that a refusal
but the wife having proved an uncon. of a wife to accompany her husband
dtional offer to return, the husband in emigrating to a foreign country Is
was held liable), and Blowers v. Sur- not in itself a desertion in the meaning
teant. 4 Dento 46.
of the statute.
1. In .Powell v. Powell 29 Vt. 148;
In Gleason v. Gleason, 4 Wiso. i-4
however, the court, though fully re- it was held that a refusal by a wife t
cognizing the general principles above accompany her husband in a change
stated, reached a different conclusion of residence from Massachusetts to
upon the facts in v. very similar case. Wisconsin would be desertion, but the
The parties had married at Milton, libelant must show that the refusaJ
Vt, where they lived a short time was unreasonable. He should at least
and then removed to New York. The show that her health was such as to
husband returned to Milton but the enable her to bear thV journey. But
wife refused to go with him "to live in HardenburgA V. .lardenburgh, 14
near his relatives." He urged her to Cal. 654, the Supreme Court of Call.
return, and told her any time she con- fornia held, not only that a refusal to
cluded to live with him, to let him accompany the husband in a change
know and he would send her money of residence from New Jersey to Calito come with. She persisted in her fornia was desertion, but that the
refusal, and he filed a libel for divorce refusal, unless explained, would be
on the ground of desertion, but the sufficient evidence of the desertion.
court refused a decree, and in deliver- In the course of the opinion, Copx,
ing the opinion, REDFrImr, C. J., said: J., said: "We have no doubt that the
"Now while we recognize fully the refusal of the wife to accompany the
right of the husband to direct the husband on a change of his residence
affairs of his own house, and to deter- followed by an actual cessation of
mine the place of abode of the family matrimonial cohabitation, or unatand that it is in generl the duty of tended by any excusing or explanathe wife to submit to such determina- tory circumstances would constitute
tions, it is still not an entirely arbi- sufficient evidence of desertion to
tary power which the husband exer- authorize a divorce. We do not see
cises in these matters. He must exer- upon what principle a different rule
cise reason and discretion in regard to could be maintained, for whether the
them. If there is any ground to con- wife abandon the residence of the
Jeoture that the husband requires the husband, or refuse to follow him upon
wife to reside where her health or her a change of his residence, the result:
comfort will be jeoparded, or even in fact, is the same, and the legal conwhere she seriously believes such re- sequence should be the same also.'
sults will follow, which will almost
In that case, however, the court was
of necessity produce the effect, and it of opinion, that on the evidence the
is only upon that ground that she wife was justified in regarding the
separates from him, the court cannot offer to take her to California, as adreiard her desertion as continued from dressed to her own choice and not to
mere willfulness."
her duty to obey, and a divorce was
4. Upon a similar view of the duties therefore refused.
of husband and wife, the Supreme
J. T. AL

MATTER OF DWIGHT SCOTT

United States District Court, Northern District of O 6.
In Bankruptcy.
MATTER OF DWIGHT SCOTT.
.ourts of bankruptcy will recognize and give effect to all liens, whether
national or State, according to their priority of date, except strict maritime
[iens, which take precedence in accordance with their character.
Under the Act of Congress of February; 1845M,
liens created by State laws
on vessels navigating the western lakes and rivers were treated as quasi mari
time Hens; but since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in 27e Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, they can no longer be regarded as of that character.
Mortgages of vessels, duly recorded as required by the Act of 1850, are enti
tied to preference over liens under the water-craft laws of Ohio, for supplies,
etc., furnished subsequently to the recording of the mortgage.

LNT 1867 Dwight Scott was the sole owner of two propellers
-the S. D. Caldwell and the Ironsides, and in the month of
June, 1868, both vessels were libeled at Cleveland for maritime
debts that were liens. The vessels were sold by order of the
District Court. Previous tb their sale, Dwight Scott, the
owner, filed his petition in the District Court, for the benefit
of the bankrupt law, and was thereon adjudged a bankrupt.
The debts on which the propellers were libeled and sold were
paid out of the proceeds of the sale, and the balance was paid
1o the assignee in bankruptcy.
Motions were filed to distribate these proceeds among the different lien-holders, and the
case was referred to a special commissioner to report on the
claims and their priorities. The case was now before the
court upon exceptions to the commissioner's report.
Wiley & Cary, for the mortgagees.
R. P. Ranney, . Williamson. Bachus, Estep & Burke, J. T.
Carran,S. 0. Griswold and Wyman, for the claimants under
the water-craft laws.
J.-Under the bankrupt law the court is bound
to recognize and enforce all valid liens, and the estate of the
bankrupt passes to the assignee, subject to all liens that were
subsisting upon it or its proceeds. The inquiry is therefore a
I roper one, what were the valid and subsisting liens and their
SHERMAN,
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order at the time the proceeds came into the hands of tu
assignee?
From the character of the claims presented, and the difficult
questions of priority arising in the cases, on application of the
parties the motions were referred to J. D. Cleveland, Esq., as
special commissioner, to inquire into and report upon the various claims and liens presented, and the order of their priority.
The commissioner in the discharge of his duty made an able
and elaborate report on the various questions submitted to him,
which, from its fullness and general accuracy, has certainly
entitled him to great credit.
From that report and the proof it appears that the propellers Caldwell and Ironsides, one of 800 tons and the other of
1,200 tons, were both enrolled and licensed at the custom house
of the Cuyahoga District, where Dwight Scott, the owner,
resided, and were both engaged in commerce and navigation
between Cleveland and other lake ports in different states, during the whole time, between the accruing of the earliest lien
and the time they were seized, libeled and sold.
There were three classes of liens set up against the proceeds1st. Strictly maratime liens, such as seamen's wages, materials, supplies and repairs in ports of other States, for damages
for collision, and for towage and wharfage in foreign ports.
There was no question as to the validity and priority of these
liens, and under former orders of the court they have been
paid.
2d. Statutory Liens-That is, claims for supplies, materials,
&c., which the laws of Ohio declare shall be liens upon vessels
navigating the waters in, or bordering upon the State, and that
they shall at once attach upon the accruing of the debt.
3d. Mortgage Liens-A mortgage on each propeller was
given by Dwight Scott, the owner, in part, for the purchase
money, and the mortgages were duly recorded according to the
Act of Congress of July 29th, 1850, in the District of Cuyahoga, the home port of the vessels.
The question presented is, as to the priority of the statutory
liens and the liens of the mortgages.
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If the so-called water-craft laws of Ohio attached to these
propellers, and had the force and effect that from their terms
they were intended to have by the legislature, then unquestionably the statutory liens will have the preference. Authorities
are cited, both in the Federal and State courts, to the effect
that this class of liens should be recognized and declared valid,
to take effect next after purely maritime liens. But on an examination of these authorities, I am satisfied that those liens
were so recognized by reason of the provisions of the Act of
Congress of February, 1845, which reserved concurrent remedies, as given by the State laws, in proceedings against vessels
navigating the western waters. Under that law, this class of
claims was treated as a species of maritime liens, only inferior
in their nature and precedence to liens allowed by the maritime
law. Even the Supreme Court, about that time, under the
power conferred upon it by Congress to prescribe forms and
process, made the twelfth rule in admiralty, which provided
that this class of claims, depending upon State btatutes, might
be enforced by proceedings in rem in the District Court, as a
court of admiralty. This rule was, however, afterward repealed, but for reasons other than want of jurisdiction : Steamer
St. Lawrence, 1 Black 522.

Previous to the Act of 1845, the opinion was entertained
and frequently asserted that the admiralty jurisdiction of the
Federal courts did not extend beyond the ebb and flow of the
tide, and therefore state laws and state courts governed and
controlled all matters in controversy arising on the western
lakes and rivers: The Jefferson, 10 Wheaton, 428 ; The Steamboat Orleans, 11 Peters 175; N ew Jersey Steam Navigation
Company v. Mferchants' Bank, 6 How. 334. In view of the

vast and rapid increase of commerce on those waters, the Act
of 1845 was passed, conferring admiralty jurisdiction on the
bistrict Court as to claims against vessels navigating the lakes
and waters connecting them, saving, however, to the parties
whatever concurrent remedy the common law might give them,
and also such remedies as may be given by the laws of the
States. Under this law, and with the ideas then universally
prevailing, the doctrine grew up that the State laws could
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create and establish liens upon that description of property.
However, as time progressed, and the want of uniformity and
consistency in the State law became manifest, the subject of
jurisdiction over vessels navigating the lakes received more
attention and was 'More closely investigated. From the time of
The Genesee Chief case, 12 How. 459, down to the cases of the
l7ie Moses Taylor and The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall.; and The
Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, the opinion has been growing that the District Court did not derive its admiralty jurisdiction over the
western waters by reason of the Act of 1815, but that it was
always possessed under the 9th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Finally, these doubts and opinions were settled at the
late session of the Supreme Court, by a decision pronounced
by Judge Nelson, in the case of The Eagle, 8 Wallace 15, to
the effect that the Act of 1845 was obsolete and of no effect,
and that general jurisdiction in admiralty upon the lakes was
conferred upon the District Courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
It follows, as the result of that decision, that if admiralty
jurisdiction was -conferred upon the District Courts by the
original Judiciary Act, it is an exclusive jurisdiction, and that
the State laws cannot create, upon property that is subject ex.lusively to admiralty laws, charges and incumbrances that in
%nyway partake of the character and force of maritime liens,
that might be superior to other charges or incumbrances of
an older date. This opinion, so well considered, and so much
in harmony as it is with the rulings of all the District Courts
along the lakes for years past, is decisive of the nature and
character of these claims, and the force and priority and effect that will hereafter be given them in the courts.
In this connection, I may cite the decision of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in a very late case, of the Steamboat General
Buell v.Long, 18 Ohio S. Rep. 521, recognizing the principles
laid down in the Moses Taylorandthe Belfast cases, and adopting them as the latest and most authoritative law on this subject. Similar casesinvolving similar principles have lately been
decided in New York, 36 Tiffany 19; in Minnesota, Griswold
v. SteamboatOtter,12 Minn. 465 ; in Indiana Ballardv. Wiltshire
28 Ind. 341; and in Kentucky, Stewart v. Harry,3 Bush 438.
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The Judiciary Act of 1789 saves to the parties all the con-urrent remedies of the common law. The lien that the
statutes of Ohio declare that these domestic claims shall have,
is not a common law, lien or remedy. It is the creation of the
statutes. The State of Ohio, as between her own citizens, and
upon property within her jurisdiction, has the authority to
declare what claims or indebtedness shall or shall not be liens,
and the force and effect of those liens upon property. She has
by her statutes declared that the class of claims now in ques.
tion shall be liens, and shall at once attach upon the property,
at the time of the creation of the debt. This court, as a bankrupt court. recognizes these statutes and would be governed by
them as far as possible, in the distribution of the proceeds of
property sold in the hands of an assignee. And if the question
before the court was, whether these claims had a preference
over a mortgage of a prior date executed and recorded according to the laws of Ohio, or over any other debt against Dwight
Scott, the bankrupt, even if it were in judgment and execution
levied on the propellers previous to the accruing of their claims
the court might order the payment of them out of their proceeds, before the mortgage and judgment were paid. It would
do so, if the statute or the decisions under it had made them
the firstlien, for the State has full authority to discriminate by
law and create preferable liens upon property so far as these
liens are created or given validity to by the State legislation.
But the mortgages on these propellers were of prior date to
any of these domestic claims. They are both dated and recorded
in April, 1867. The claims bear date at different times from
May, 1867, to May, 1868. The mortgages are both recorded in
pursuance of the Act of Congress of July 29, 1850, which provides substantially that no mortgage of a vessel shall be valid
against any person, except the mortgagor and his representatives, unless such mortgage shall be recorded in the office of
the collector of customs in the district where the vessel is
registered or enrolled. By virtue of the mortgage, the mortgagees acquired a lien on the vessels to the amount named in
them, and by the recording of them, they gave notice to the
world, including these claimants, that such a lien existed.
23
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The mortgages are no more a maritime lien than,theu domestic claims are. The mortgages and claims are of equal validity,
and both were a charge and lien upon the propellers, to be paid
according to their priority of date. If the claims had been of
a prior date to the mortgages, they would have had a preference, and been paid first out of the proceeds of the sale, but as
they happened to be of subsequent date they must give way
to the mortgages.
That Congress has the power to give validity to mortgages
on vessels by authorizing their record in the office of the collectors of the customs in the home port, has been repeatedly
settled. Under the power given in the Constitution to regulate commerce, Congress having created, as it were, this
species of property, and conferred upon it its chief value, there
can be no reason but that power may be extended to the
security and protection of the rights and title of all persons
dealing therein: Blanchard v. brig kfartha Washington,I Clifford 463; White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wallace 646.
The conclusion I have arrived at may seem to be in conflict with the decisions in Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72, and
Provost v. Wilcox, 17 Ohio 359, wherein it is held that the
claims of creditors for supplies and materials to a vessel, are,
under the water-craft laws of Ohio, to be preferred as against
a mortgage. These decisions were made in 1848, and previous to the Act of Congress of July, 1850, and the question
in those cases was between the domestic lien holders, and a
mortgage executed and recorded under the State statutes. It
was, therefore, a different question from the one presented in
this case, and in view of their late decision in the case of the
Steamboat Gen. Buell, there can be no doubt but that court
would arrive at the same conclusion I have done.
Let an order be entered, and distribution made according
to the principles herein laid down.
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Court of Errors and Appea s of Mississiryi.
ELIZA ROBINSON V. M. H. HARBOUR.
A vendor who has taken the notes-of the vendee and given bond to mnke Utle
on the payment of the purchase-money, may, by an assignment of the notes,
pass his lien for the purchase-money, and the assignee may proceed in equity
to subject the land to the payment of his debt.
Covenants by vendor and vendee are to be construed as dependent or inde.
pendent, according to the intention of the parties; and in ascertaining the
intention, thb court lays down the following rules:
1. If a day be appointed for payment of money, or part of it, or for doing any
other act, and the day is to happen or may happen before .the thing which is
the consideration of the money or other act is to be performed, an action may
ue brought for the money, or for not doing such other act, before performance;
for it appears that the party relled upon his remedy, and did not intend to
make the performance a condition precedent; and so it is where no time is
fLxed for performance of that which is the consideration of the money or other
.aot.
2. But when a day is appointed for the payment of money, or for doing any
other act, and the day is to happen after the thing which is the consideration
of the money or other act is to be performed, no action can be maintained for
the money, etc., before performance.
3. Where a covenant goes only to part of the consideration, on both sides,
and a breach of such covenant may be compensated in damages, it is an independent covenant, and an action may be maintained for a breach of the cove.
nant on the part of the defendant, without averring performance in the
declaration.
4. Where the acts of the parties are concurrent, and to be done or performed
at the same time, the covenants are dependent, and neither party can maintain an action against the other without averring and proving performance on
his part.
Where the vendee of land covenants to pay for the same by instalments,
and the vendor covenants to make him a title when the last instalment is
paid, the covenants of the vendee to pay the instalment, except the last one,
are independent covenants. But the covenant "ofthe vendee to pay the last
instalment, and the covenant of the vendor to make title, are dependent covenants, and to entitle either of them to maintain an action against the other,
he mast aver and prove performance or tender or offer of performance of his
part of the agreement.

I- December, 1859, one Hall sold to Eliza Robinson, the
appellant, certain land, for the sum of $2,440, one-half of which
was paid in cash at the time of the sale, and for the other half
she executel her promissory note of that date, payable to the
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order of said Hall, on the first day of January, 1861, and Hlall
at the same time executed and delivered to the said Eliza
Robinson his bond conditioned to make her a title to said
land, when said note for the balance of the purchase-money
was paid, and placed her in possession of the land, which she
has retained ever since.
On the 3d day of February, 1860, the said Hall assigned the
said note for value to M. i. Hlarbour, who filed his bill in the
Chancery Court of said county of Yalobusha, to subject the said
land to the payment of said note. To this bill the -defendant,
Eliza Robinson, demurred, on the grounds of the want of equity
on the face of the bill, and that the complainant had not made
or tendered to her a deed of the land, and demanded the purchase-money, so as to put her in default, before filing said bill.
The demurrer was overruled by said court, and this is the
error assigned here.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PEYTON, J.-There is no doubt that the vendor of land who
has taken the notes of the vendee, and given bond conditioned
to convey the title when the purchase-money is paid, can, by
an assignment of the notes, pass his lien for the purchasemoney, and that the assignee may proceed in equity to subject
the land to the payment of his debt : Tanner v. Hicks, 4 S. &
M., 2941, and Terry v. George, 37 Miss., 539.
The main question presented by the record for our determination is, whether the covenants of the vendor and vendee
in this case are dependent or independent covenants? And
upon this subject it must be conceded that there has been considerable oscillation of the judicial pendulum, and, what i,
much to be regretted, a great want of uniformity and harmony
in the decisions of our own courts.
Knowing the necessity of some certain.intelligible and cor
rect ru!e, with respect to the constructiou and chara'ter of covenan 's in agreemnent<, we have giveu the subject that thorough
investigation and mature conzideration which its importance demands. The order of time in which covenants are to
be performed is an important consideration in determining
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whether they are dependent or independent. And the rule
seems to be clear and indisputable that where there are sev.
eral covenants, which are independent of each other, one party
may bring an action against another for breach of his covenants, without averring a performance, or tender or offer of
performance, of the covenants on his part; and it is no excuse
for the defendant to allege in his plea a breach of the covenants
on the part of the plaintiff. But where the covenants are dependent it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove a
performance, or tender and offer to perform his part of the
agreement, and demand performance by the other party of his
part of the agreement, to entitle himself to an action for the
breach of the covenants, on the part of the defendant. The difficulty lies in the application of this rule to the particular case.
It is justly observed that covenants are to be construed to be
either dependent or independent of each other, according to the
intention and meaning of the parties and the good sense of the
case, and technical words should give way to such intention.
In order, therefore, to discover that intention, and thereby to
learn, with some degree of certainty, when performance is
necessary to be averred in the declaration and when not, it
may not be improper to lay down a few rules which will perhaps be found useful for that purpose, as follows:
1st. If a day be appointed for payment of money, or part of
it, or for doing any other act, and the day is to happen' or may
happen before the thing which is the consideration of the money
or other act is to be performed, an action may be brought for
the money, or for not doing such other act before performance;
for it appears that the party relied upon his remedy, and did
not intend to make the performance a condition precedent
and so it is where no time is fixed for performance of that whicl
is the consideration of the money or other act.
2d. But when a day is appointed for the payment of money,
or for doing any other act, and the day is to happen after the
thing which is the consideration of the money or other act is
to be performed, no action can be maintained for the money,
etc., before performance.
3d. Where a covenant goes only to part of the consideration
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on both sides, and a breach of such covenant may be compen.
sated in damages, it is an independent covenant, and an action
may be maintained for a breach of the covenant on the part of
the defendant, without averring performance in the declaration.
4th. Where the acts or covenants of the parties are concurrent, and to be done or performed at the same time, the covenants, are dependent, and neither party can maintain an
action against the other without averring and proving performance on his part.
When tested by these rules, it will be found that the broad
doctrine laid down by this court, in the cases of Clopton v.
Bolt,m, 23 Miss. 78; _ilfclath v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 439, and
others based upon their authority, cannot be sustained. These
cases hold that where the vendee of land executes his notes to
secure the payment of the purchase-money in instalments, and
takes a bond from the vendor, conditioned to make title when
the last instalment is paid, the covenants are independent, and
the vendor may enforce payment without performance or an
offer and tender of performance of his part of the agreement.
0
These cases, it is believed, are founded on a mistaken view of
the cases of Gibson v. Newman, 1 How. 341, and of Coleman
v. Rowe, 5 How. 460.
In the case of Gibson v. _Yewman, the vendee of a lot of
ground in the city of Vicksburg executed his notes for $1,800,
payable in three annual instahnents, and the vendor agreed to
make him a good title to the lot. But there was no time fixed
for the making of the title, and for that reason the covenants
of the parties were independent covenants, and were very properly so declared b'v the court. And the report of the case of
(,l,man v. Row-, is very nsatisfactoryv, as it does not show
when the bill was filed, whether on the maturity of the first
instalment or after all the instalments had become due, and
seems to have been founded on the case of Gibson v. Newman,
which as we have shown. does not sustain the doctrine enunciatol in the caze- of' Ckpt-w v. Bolton, and P1fath v. John
When the vendee of land covenants to pay for the same bY
instalments, and the vendor covenants to make him a title
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when the last instalment is paid, the covenants of.the vendee
to pay the instalments except the last one, are independent
covenants. But the covenant of the vendee to pay the last
instalment, and the covenant of the vendor to make title, are
dependent covenants, and to entitle either of them to maintain
an action against the other, he must aver and prove performance, or tender or offer of performance of his part of the
agreement. The payment of this instalment ot the money and
the making of the title are concurrent acts of the parties to be
done or performed at the same time, and are therefore dependent covenants.
This rule is sustained by reason and authority, and accords
with the justice of the case and the intentio n of the parties.
Suppose the whole of the purchase-money had been payable at
once, instead of being payable by instalments, and the stipulation had been to pay three thousand dollars in twelve months,
the deed to be executed at the payment, upon this statement of
the question is there a doubt that the agreement would have been
mutually dependent and conditional? And what difference is
there whether the final payment is the whole or part? Where
the whole of the purchase-money is to be paid at once, and the
deed is then to be given, the covenants are held to be dependent,
because it is unreasonable to presume that the purchaser intended to pay the whole consideration without having an
equivalent in a title to the land purchased. The same reason
applies to the last instalment. An obvious reason why the
prior instalments should be paid without having a deed is, that
the vendee was content to rely on the vendor's contract for his
future title; but no such reason applies to the final and complete payment of the purchase-money. Whether we consider
the particular language, or the general intent of the parties,
the covenants between them were mutually dependent and conditional, and the vendor cannot recover without averring performance or an offer to perform on his part: Kane v. Hood, 13
Pick. 281; RunkNe v. Johnson, 30 flhinois 328, 332.
This court has repeatedly decided that the vendor of land,
who has given bond to make titlk to the vendee on payment of
the purchase-money, cannot maintain a bill for the specific per.
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formance of the contract, until he has put the vendee in default
by a tender of a deed. The covenants to make title and to pay
the money are concurrent, mutual and dependent, and neither
party can insist on a performance of the contract without an
offer or tender of performance on his part, and this rule applies
with equal force in law and equity: Mobley v. Keys, 13 S. &
M. 677'; Ecford v. Halbert, 30 Miss. 273; Klyce v. Broyles,
37 Mis. 524, and fcAlister v. A-oye, Id. 258.
Courts will construe covenants to be dependent unless a contrary intention clearly appears. A party shall not be forced
to pay out his money unless he can get that for which he stipulated: Stockton v. George, 7 How. 172; Peques v. Mosby, 7
S & M. 340, 3417; TlIadlington v. Hill, 10 S. & M. 560;
Bank of Columbia v. Hagner, I Peters 455, and 2 Wendell
297.
The cases of Leftwzitch v. Cole'm n, 3 How. 167, and Rectory.
Price, Id. 321, referred to in -Ifc-fath v. Johnson, do not support the doctrine laid down in that case; upon reference to
them, it will be found they were both cases of independent
covenants. In the first case, a note was given for land, payable on a day fixed and before thp time the deed for the land was
to be executed, and, in the other case, there was no time fixed
for procuring the deed which was the consideration of the note
sued on. The case of JfcJfath v. Johnson was correctly decided
upon the facts of the case. But it lays down a doctrine to
which we cannot give our assent, and relies upon the case of
Cloj)ton v. Bolton, as an authority conclusive to show that the
covenants of an agreement are all independent when the conveyance is to be made upon the payment of the last instalment
of the purchase-money. In that case, the court says, "1on the
one part, there were instruments for the payment of the purchase-money at several different periods; on the other, an obliglation to nmke title upon full payment of the purchase-money.
Suppose the suit had been brought as soon as the first instalmeut fell due-would it be contended that the plaintiff should
make a deed before he could recover that instalment, in the
face of his obligation to make title when all the money was
paid ? Certainly not. This shows beyond doubt that the cove-
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nants were intended to be independent." Witl all duerespuot,
we thiuk this is a non sequitur, a conclusion not warranted by
the premises. The fact that some of the covenants in an
agreement are independent does not necessarily render others
so: (Grantv. Johnson, 1 Selden 247, and Babcock v. Wilson,
5 Shep. 372.
The case of (lopton v. Boltor was an action on two writings
obligatory, payable twelve and twenty-four months after date,
given for the purchase of a tract of land. The defendant
pleaded that fact, and that the plaintitl at the time of the contract, executed a bond to make title where the purchase-money
should be paid, and that the plaintiffdid not, before the bringing
the suit, tender a deed to the defendant for the land. The
court decided that the covenants were independent, and that
the failure to tender the deed constituted no bar to the action.
It has been held that a covenant to pay a certain sum of
money, one-half on a certain day, and the other half on a certain subsequent day, at which time the covenantee was 'to
execute and deliver a deed, so far as respects the first payment,
is independent, but as to the other is dependent, and in an
action thereon, the tender of the deed must be averred, as in
a declaration for the whole sum, after both instalments have
become due: Biddle v. Corgell,-3 Harrison 377, and Leonard
v. Bates, 1 Blackford 172.
In contracts where either party might be compelled to part
with his money or his property without receiving the stipulated equivalent, the latest and best action of the courts has
been to hold that the party seeking to enforce the contract
must make his own part of the agreement preceding, and
allege either a performance or a tender and refusal: Madtin ton v. Hill, 10 S. & M. 562. And a mere offer to make a
deed, and averment of readiness at all times to make it, will
not do: Kyce v. Broyles, 37 Miss. 524.

This principle applies in all cases to the last instalment when
the vendee gives the vendor a bond for a title when the money
or last instalment is paid. For it is not to be presumed that
the vendee intended to pay his money without receiving the
stipulated equivalent in a title to the land purchased, nor that-
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the vendor intended to part with the title to the land sold
without receiving the money. The conveyance and the last
payment were intended to be simultaneous acts.
We have arrived at the conclusion, that in this case the
covenants between the assignor of the appellee and the appellant were dependent covenants, and that the appellee could
not maintain his bill without averrhig and proving a performatice of the covenant on the part of the vendor or tender, or
offer to perform, before the filing of the bill. The averment or
the bill that the assignor of the note is ready and willing to
execute a deed on payment of the purchase-money, is not sufficient to sustain it; and for this reason, we think the court
,below erred in overruling the demurrer to the bill.
SHACKLEFORD,

0. J., dissented, and referred to Bowman v.

Bailey, 10 Verm. 170, for his views on the question decided
in this opinion.

United States District Court, District of Wisconsin.
ALFRED L. CAREY V.. R. NAGEL ET AL.
Where a mutual Insurance company was authorized by a supplement to itU
charter to make insurances "for a specific rate of premium to be paid in cash,
it the same manner as insurance companies, other than mutual insurance com.
panies, are accustomed to do," the company could take a note for such preiniums. The object of the supplement was to enable the company to issue two
classes of policies, one on the mutual plan to persons who should become
members, and one on the non-mutual plan to persons who should not become
members but should pay their premiums In cash. The acceptance of a note
by the company was a mere extension of the time of payment, and did not
make it any the less a payment in cash.
The bankruptcy of the company is no defense to an action by the assignee on
such a note.

THIs was an action by the assignee in bankruptcy of the
Mfilwaukee Insurance Company, to recover the amount of a
note made by the defendants to the company for a policy, for
$240, payable in sums of $60 on the first day of May annually
for four years, without interest until due, and in case default
should be made in the payment in any of the instalments:
then the whole to become due.
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The company was incorporated and did business for several years as a mutual insurance company, issuing policies
and taking back notes, such policy holders being members
of the company.
By an act to amend the act to incorporate the company, it
was provided that "The company shall have power in their
discretion to make any and all insurances which by. law they
are or may be authorized to make, to any person or persons
with whom they may agree to that effect, for a specific rate of
premium to be paid in cash, in the same manner as insurance
companies other than mutual insurance companies are accustomed to. And in all such cases the insured shall.not become
members of the company, nor in any wise entitled to any share
of the profits, premiums or earnings, nor in any wise liable
for the losses, debts or liabilities of the said company, and
all premiums received for such insurance shall be passed to
the general credit of the company, and all losses growing out
of said special policies shall be paid in like manner as losses
under the ordinary policies of the company."
MTLLR, D. J.-A policy was issued for four years, under
the amendment to the charter of the company, upon receipt of
the note in suit for the payment of the annual premium. It is
contended by the defendant's counsel that the premiums should
be paid in cash simultaneously with the delivery of the policy,
and that the company could not accept a note payable at a
future time. The object of the amendment to the charter was
to vest in the company the additional power to issue policies as
a stock company for a specific rate of premium to be paid in
cash. Insurance under this act may be made in the same
manner as other insurance companies not mutual. Policy
holders stand in a different relation to the company from those
under the mutual system. The insured under the amended
charter are not members of the company, nor entitled to a share
of the profits, premiums or earnings of the company, nor subject
to losses. I do not think the act requires premiums to be paid
simultaneously with delivery and acceptance of policies. The
act authorizes the company to make insurance to any person
for a specific rate of premium to be paid in cash, in the same
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manner as stock companies. The company was not prohibited
from extending the time of payment of premiums in cash.
The company could transact business in this respect as other
companies, and make its agreement with the insured as to the
time of payment of premiums in cash. The note was a mere
regulation of the time of payment for the accommodation of
the defendants. The premium was to be paid in cash, but the
time of payment was extended. There is no statute law prohibiting such extension. The policy issued to these defendants
imports a settlement of the premiums to the satisfaction of the
company simultaneously with its execution and delivery, and
binds the company in case of loss by fire, even if the note had
not been given, or if the insured should become insolvent and
unable to pay the premium. It is an every day practice with
stock companies to issue policies upon credit, containing exemption from liability on non-payment of the premiums. A provision in a policy duly executed, that no insurance, whether original or continued, should be binding until the actual payment of
the premium, and the written acknowledgment thereof does
not invalidate a subsequent contract by parol, to renew such
insurance for a premium not paid at the time the risk attaches,
but postponed to a future day, Irustees v. Broo7lyn Is. Co., 19
'New York 305. In Insurance Company v. Sturgis, 2 Cowen
664, notes were received for premiums. See also Commercial
Ins. Co. v. Union Ins. Co., 19 Howard 318; Furniss v. Gilchrist, 1 Sanford 53; McIntyre v. Preston, 5 Gilman 48;
Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Barr 339. The contractbetween the insurer and the insured is mutual but independent,
and failure of one party literally to comply on his part does
not exempt the other from inability. I am satisfied that under the amended charter the company had lawful authority
to issue policies upon a simultaneous payfnent of the premiums in cash, or upon an extension of the time of payment
by taking a note, or even without a note or security.
It is not necessary to consider the question whether the
defendants are estopped from making this defense.
The note in suit is a portion of the capital of the company
for the payment of losses by fire. If defendants' property
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covered by.the policy had been damaged or destroyed by fire,
the company was bound by its contract of insurance to pay the
loss. And in case of distribution of assets among creditors
utder the bankrupt act, defendants would be entitled to their
pro ratashare. The note being accepted by the company in
lieu of cash paid at the date of the policy, is recoverable as so
much assets, and defendants are in no worse condition by giving the note in lieu of paying the premium: Hone v. Boyd, 1
Sanford 481; White v. Haight, 16 New York 310; Sterling
v. Ins. Co., 32 Pa. State Rep. 75; Sands v. Hill, 42 Barbour
651; Huntley v. Beecher, 30 Barbour 580; Alliance Ins. Co.
v. Swift, 10 Gushing 433; Huntley v. Aferrill, 32 Barbour
626; Clark v. Middleton, 19 Missouri 53. Upon the same
principle the insolvency of a corporation is no ground for
restraining collection ofsubscriptions for stock: Dillv. Wabash
R.R.Co., 21 Illinois 91. And stockholders are liable on their
subscription to the stock of an insolvent company: Ogilvie v.
Knox Ins. Co., 22 Howard 380. Judgment for plaintiff.

Court of Chancery of Delaware.
SPARKS V. THE FARMERS' BANK OF DELAWARE.
Where A becomes surety for the faithful discharge of B's duties as cashier,
the obligation continues so long as B holds the office by virtue of the appointment under which the bond is given. Though the office be usually treated a;
elective for one year only, yet the surety will be liable for B's acts if B continue in office after the year. But on B's re-election and qualification for a
second term, the liability on the old bond ceases.
If the term of an officer, created by a statute or charter, is not limited to expire at a fxed time, or upon a specified event, but there is merely a direction
for his annual election, his original term continues, though after the year, untii
a successor be duly elected and qualified.
Where neither the charter nor by-laws of a corporation fixes the term of office
of its ashierbut vests the appointment of all officers in the " directors for the
time being," a cashier so appointed holds his office during the pleasure of the
directors, unless they, at the time of appointment, limit the duration of his
office to a specified term.
Under such circumstances, a general resolution of a board of directors that
I-he cashier should be annually elected, and the practice of thatand subsequent
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boards, to hold elections annually, constituted him an annual officer in a certain sense, but not so entirely as to make his term of office expire ipso facto, at.
the end of the year. It is a question of what term the board intended to elect
for. And where the charter prescribed thatthe cashier, before entering on the
duties of his office, should give bond, ete., it will be presumed that the board
intended the old cashier to continue in office until the new one should not only
be elected but qualified to take his place.
Therefore, where a cashier was elected, and gave bond in one year, and was
re-elected the next year, but failed to give a new bond, it was held that he was
in office by virtue of his first election, and his sureties were liable for his actu
during the second year.
The fact that the bank neglected to have the cashier's bond renewed on his
re-election, whereby the bond of the original sureties remained in force after
the period they had been led to expect, does not estop the bank from proceed.
tg on the bond; it not appearing that the expectation as to the time their
bond was to be in force was due to representations by the bank.
Nor is the bank estopped by its failure to examine the cashier's accounts
with such frequency as to discover his defalcations within the year in which
they took place. The bank owed the sureties good faith, not diligence.
In a court of equity the statute of limitations on a cause of action which has
been fraudulently concealed, runs from the discovery of the fraud. This priuci.
pie applied to a defalcation by the cashier of a bank, though a more frcquent
and diligent examination of his affairs by the officers of the bank ought to
have disclosed the defalcation within the statutory period after its occurrence.

THIs was a bill in equity by the sureties in two official
bonds of Joseph A. Heston, late cashier of the Farmers'
Bank, to restrain the bank from proceeding at law to collect
from complainants the amount of certain alleged defalcations
of Heston, committed while cashier.
The bonds bore date respectively, January 1, 1862, and
January 6, 1865.
BATES, Chancellor.--The sureties claim to be relieved upon
three distinct grounds:
I. The ground chiefly relied upon was that their obligation
under each of these bonds was for Heston's good behavior as
cashier, only during the current year--commencing with his
election by the general board at Dover, at its annual meeting
in January next before the taking of the bond, and ending
po facto upon his re-election by the same board in Tanuary
next following; that is to say, that under the bond of 1862,
the sureties were liable only for such defaults as might be comvaitted within the year 1862, and until Heston's re-election in
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January, 1863; and that under the bond of 1865, they were
liable only for defaults committed .within that year and until
his re-electibn in January, 1866; and further, that no defaults
were committed within the years 1862 and 1865.
Heston was first chosen cashier by the directors of the
branch bank at Wilmington, February 13, 1858. This was a
temporary appointment, continuing until the meeting of the
general board, in January, 1859, when he was regularly elected
by the board. Subsequently, he was re-elected by the general
board, in January of each year, until 1867, the year in which
he was removed. After each of these elections he took an
oath of office. He also gave a new official bond in each
of the years 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862 and 1865. For reasons
not necessary to be stated, the taking of bond was dispensed
with in 1863 and 1864.
The bonds are taken in the corporate name of the principal
bank, and to each there is a condition, without any recital preceding it, in these words:
"The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bound
Joseph A. Heston shall behave himself well, and faithfully discharge his duties as cashier of the branch of the Farmers' Bank at
Wilmington, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to be
and remain in full force and virtue in law."
Then follows a warrant of attorney for the confession of
judgment, under which the bank were proceeding against tho
sureties when restrained by the preliminary injunction.
It will be observed that the obligation of the sureties is not
by the terms of the condition or by any recital in the bond
limited to a definite period, as for a year; but their under.
taking is for Heston's good behavior "as cashier." Then, ac.
cording to a settled rule of construction, their obligation is
coextensive with the duration of Heston's office: Addison on
Contracts 663. And to the rule as thus stated there should be
added this qualification, viz.: that the undertaking of the sureties in either bond was for Heston's good behavior only so long
as he should hold his office by virtue of the election pursuant
to which the bond was given; so that their obligation under
such bond would cease, as well upon his re-election and qualifi.
cation for a new term of office, as upon the election and qua]ifi
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cation of another person as his successor: Addison on (Jon.
tracts 662, and cases cited; Bigelow v. Bridge, 8 Mass. 274.
This leads directly to the main question discussed upon this
branch of the case, viz: Whether the office of cashier is an
"annual office"--one that expires at each annual meeting of
the general board in January, upon the election of a successor,
or the re-election of the incumbent---and if an "annual office,"
then whether the term of the incumbent expires ipsofacto upon
a new election in January, or continues until the qualification
of his successor by giving bond, or upon his being himself
duly qualified in case of his re-election. It is upon the latter
question that the case will be found to turn.
It is very clear that by no provision of the charter nor by
any by-law or ordinance of the stockholders is the cashiership
made an annual office or a term office of any kind, such as is
the office of the president of the bank. The charter, by See.
11 ( 4 Delaware Laws 494), vests the appointment of all "officers, clerks and servants" of the corporation (which includes
cashiers) in the "directors for the time being." It confers a
simple, absolute power both of appointment and removalaffixing no term to the cashier's office, but making it subject
to the pleasure of the board, so that a cashier being elected
would, so far as the charter and by-laws affect his term of office, hold until his death, or resignation, or removal by some
action of the board; or, should the board have seen fit at the
time of electing or appointing a cashier, to limit his term of
service to a definite time, or to the happening of some specified
event, his office would in that case expire at thetime or upon
the event designated. It would so expire, not by force of any
limitation attaching to the office itself, but by the terms of
the incumbent's appointment to it.
But it was insisted for the complainants that the office,
though not made an annual one by the charter, by-laws or ordinances, has become such under certain resolutions adopted
by the general board in 1825 and 1826, directing the annual.
election of cashiers, and by the uniform usage of the corporation since the adoption of those resolutions to hold annual eledons in conformity therewith. Such action on the part of the
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general board, the body invested by the charter with the absolute control of the subject, is claimed to have all the force
of a charter provision to constitute this an annual office.
Before taking up this question, it is necessary to advert to
the practice of the general board, in the election of cashiers
from the period of the bank's organization.
Prior to 1825, the action of the board was governed by no
rule. From the organization of the principal bank, in 1807,
*cashiers for that bank and for the branches were elected annually, until 1810. From that year until 1823 there were no
elections except to fill vacancies, but the cashiers remained in
office without re-election. In 1823, the cashiers and tellers
then in office were re elected, and were ordered by a resolution
to give bond with surety for good behavior. In 18241, there
was no election. In 1825, the board elected cashiers and tellers, and then for the first time adopted a rule intended to
govern its future action, which (with some other matters) was
embodied in a series of resolutions. The resolution relating
to this subject was in these words:
".Resolvedfurther, That the persons to fill the respective offices
of cashiers and clerks in the different departments of this bank,
shall be balloted for at the present meeting, and annually at the
meeting of the general board of directors, in the month of January
of each year hereafter, and shall, on entering upon the duties of
those offices, respectively give bond and warrant of attorney, in a
manner and form prescribed by the Act of Assembly in such case
made and provided."
Preceding this was another resolution, by which the cashiers
of the respective banks were directed to cause proceedings for
the collection of interest due and in arrears more than twenty
days prior to the declaring of each semi-annual dividend; and
this duty was enforced bya declaration "that the cashier or cashiers who shall neglect or refuse to comply with this provision
shall not be allowed to be nominated or voted forat annual elections thereafter to fill the said office, but be wholly excluded
therefrom." In the next year, 1826, cashiers and tellers were
elected, and a further resolution, evidently supplementary to
that of 1825, was adopted respectingthe bonds of these officers.
That the cashier and clerk of the principal bank and the cashiers
and clerks of the respective branch banks enter into bond with
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surety and sureties and warrants of attorney, conditioned as prbvided by the law for the faithful performance of their offices as required by a former by-law or by-laws of this institution, and that
such bonds be duly executed and submitted for their approbation
to the respective boards of directors within twenty days after their
appointments respectively in the present and subsequent years.
In 1827, and from thence until this time, cashiers and tellers
have been annually elected or re-ekcted, and when elected or
re-elected have giv en official bonds and taken oaths of office,
except that in 1863, 1864, 1866 and 1867 the bonds were
dispensed with.
This reference to the transactions of the general board of
directors presents all that is at present material, and I proceed
now to state to counsel the views formed, after much reflection,
upon the points discussed touching the effect of the resolutions
of 1825-26, and the subsequent practice of the general board.
1. And, first, there seems to be no doubt that the power of
appointing cashiers for the branch ban ks is vested in the general board-the branch boards having only authority to fill
vacancies occurring within the year by temporary appointments
to continue until an election by the general board-an authority
at first exercised from necessity, and since 184:9 under the
statute of that year authorizing such temporary appointments
of all officers of branch banks.
*
*
*
2. Further, I am of opinion that the resolutions of 1825-6,
and the practice of the general board to elect the cashier annually, pursuant to its direction, did make the office for the time
being "an annual office," though not so strictly such as to
expire ipso facto at the end of the year or at the annual meeting of the board, or even upon the election alone of a successor
or the re-election of the incumbent-not until both the election
and qualification of the newly elected or re-elected officer.
It was insisted at the bar that what purport on the minutes
of the general board to have been re-elections of the incumbent cashiers from year to year were not suchin fact; that Ihe}
were intended not to create a new term of office, but rather as
an annual assent to the continuance of the old term, the officer
holding throughout under his original appointment, so that
Heston, notwithstanding these re-elections, continued to be
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cashier by virtue of his election by the branch board in 1858,
without any change in his term of office. But the proceedings
of the general board, as shown by the minutes, will not bear
this construction. They had all the formalities of elections
As such they were minuted on the journals and, certified to the
branch boards concerned, were invariably followed by new
official oaths, and with the exception before stated, by new
official bonds. The proceedings were the same in all respects
as for the election of the president, who by the charter was an
annual officer. They were manifestly intended ag annual
elections of the cashier held in direct conformity with the
resolutions of 1825-6.
In the Massachusetts cases, Dedham Bank-v. Chickering, 3
Pick. 335, and Bank of Amherst v. Boot, 2 Met. 523, successive re-elections of a cashier were held to be but expressions of
assent to a continuing office, but these decisions rest upon
special circumstances which distinguish those cases from the
present one.
Again, it was argued that the resolutions of 1825-6, and
the practice of the board pursuant to them, could not of their
own force make the cashier's office "an annual office;" that
only a provision of the charter or a by-law could have that
effect. This is true so far, that the resolutions and the practice of the board did not affix a term to the office, making it
an annual one in the same sense as is that of the president of
the bank, such that succeeding boards could not elect for a
longer period than one year. It was a self-imposed regulation
which any board might disregard. Nevertheless, inasmuch as
the boards succeeding those of 1825 and 1826 have chosen to
conform to the resolutions, and to elect or re-elect cashiers
annually pursuant thereto, they have by the terms of their
appointment made the office, in fact and for the time being, an
annual one, though not so by law or charter. The question is
simply one of intention on the part of the general board, for
what term of service they intended to elect the cashier, whether
for one year or indefinitely. Their intention may be implied
as well as expressed. A special resolution of the board adopted
at each annual election defining the term of office therebv con.
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ferred, would, beyond all doubt, have limited it accordingly.
Certainly, the general resolutions of 1825-6 serve quite as
conclusively to define the term of 'office under the successive
elections, since held pursuant to them.
3. But this brings us to the point which is decisive against
this branch of the complainant's case. Although under the
practice of the general board, pursuant to the resolutions of
1825-6, the cashier's office has become in a general sense an
"annual one," the term of the incumbent cashier does not
expire ipso facto upon the election of his successor, or upon his
ownre-election, but his term continues, and by consequence his
official bond remains in force, until his successor becomes
qualified for the office by giving an officialbond, or in case of
a re-election until the incumbent shall be himself qualified in
like manner for his new term of office.
Such is the effect of the resolutions and of the practice of
the board. For, otherwise, there would not be a proper succession of cashiers, qualified as is required by the charter.
There would be annually an interval between the election and
the giving of bond pursuant to it, during which the bank
would be without any official security whatever. It is to protect the bank against this very result that a fundamental article of the charter (Art. 8 of Sec. 12) requires that the cashier
before entering upon the duties of his office shall be required to

give bond; and in conformity with this article and to secure
the same end, the resolution of 1825, in providing for annual
elections, expressly directs that the ctshier elect shall give bond
"on entering" upon the office; and although by the supplementary resolution of 1826 twenty days were allowed him within
which to provide his sureties, it is to be twenty days after his
appointment, not after his entry uponthe office; so that, clearly,
the giving of a bond by a cashier-elect is to precede or at least
be contemporaneous with his entry upon office or upon a new
term of office. Now, in the absence of any expression whatever, limiting the term of the incumbent cashier to expire '{pso
facto upon the next annual election or re-election, it is the reasonable construction of the resolutions of 1825-6 that the old
term shall continue until the new term is duly entered upon by
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the giving of an official bond in accordance with the eighth
fundamental article.
The case is not within the point ruled in Bank of the United
States v. Dandridge,12 Wheaton 64. It was there held that
if a bank permit a person to act as cashier without his having
given bond as required by the charter, his acts as cashier de
facto will incur against the bank the same responsibilities and
to some extent will require for it the same rights as if he had
been duly qualified. But here the question is whether upon a
fair construction of the resolution under which the cashier
was re-elected he is to be considered after a re-election as acting ii his new term of office before security given for it, or
in his old term continued until he shall be newly qualified.
There is a further consideration necessary to a complete view
of the subject. It is this: In holding that the term of office of
the cashier under elections by the general board, pursuant to
the resolutions of 1825-6, continues until there shall be a qualified successor in the same office, I have but extended to the
resolutions of 1825-6, and the elections held under them the
same principle of construction which the common law applies
to like provisions made by statute or charter for the annual
election of officers.
The principle is, that if the term of an officer, civil or corporate, created by statute or charter, is not limited to expire at a
fixed time, or upon specified event, but there is simply a direction for the annual election of the officer, his original term continues, though after the year, until a successor is duly elected and
qualified. It is true that this, as a general common law principle
has been doubted by Chancellor WALWORTH, in 1 Paige 595.
.In2 Kent's Com. 295, the principle is treated as not definitely
settled upon authority, though it is supported by the author's
great name. It was also affirmed by the Supreme Court of New
York, in People v. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147,.and Trustees of Ver-

non Society v. Hill, 6 Cowen 23. The apparent uncertainty oif
the English authorities on this point is removed by discriminating between the cases arising under statutory provisions
expressly limiting the office to expire at the end of the year, or
directing that the election be held on a fixed day, and the cases
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in which a term is implied from the direction to elect annually,
without limiting the election to a fixed day. A provision for
holding an election on afixed day was held to be peremptory,
but one for electing annually, without a day fixed, was treated
as directory only. The distinction is one of questionable soundness; yet it harmonizes the cases, and gives certainty to the
rule adjudged by them.
Of the former class was the Banbury case in 10 Mod. 346,
in which a corporation was held dissolved through a failure to
elect a mayor on a charter day, it being a day fixed by the
charter, and no provision for continuing the office. It was
against the mischief resulting from this class of decisions, in
working the dissolution of corporations through the failure to
elect on charter days, that the Statute 11 Geo. I. was passed
eight years after the Banbury case, which statute provided that
a corporation should not be dissolved by a failure to elect on
charter day. This statute simply extended to all corporate
elections, even though appointed for a fixed day, or though the
office was expressly limited to a year, the same principle which
had already been adjudged to apply to offices held under a mere
direction to elect annually. That this latter class of cases does
not stand upon the statute of Geo. I. will appear from a slight
reference to them. The Queen v. Durham, 10 Mod. 146 was
in 11 Anne. It was a mandamus to restore to office a town
clerk, to which the corporation returned that,under the charter,
the clerk was to be annually chosen, and that the year had
expired. The court held the return to be insufficient, distinguishing between an officer made by charter annuatim eligibilis
and an officer eligibilispro uno anno tantum. "Though," said
the court, "he be annuatimeligibilis, he may continue town
clerk, and will do so until they choose another"-" if the return had been eligibilispro uno anno tantum, his office would
have expired at the end of the year, whether they had chosen
another or not." Another case, more like the present one, is
in 12 Mod. 256. There, a successor to a constable had been
elected, but not qualified; yet he was held not to be discharged
until his successor was appointed and sworn in, "because the
parish cannot be without an officer." This principle was finally
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settled in England on appeal to the House of Lords, and upon
great consideration, in Foot v. Prowse, 1 Strange 625; 2 Bro.
Parl. Cas. 289. The mayor of Truro was to be chosen from
among the aldermen, and in the presence oftwo aldermen. The
aldermen were annuatimelegendi, but no election for aldermen
had been held for several years. The present mayor was chosen
from among the aldermen last election and holding over-two
of them being present. The Court of King's Bench held the
election of mayor void, for want of an annual election of the
' aldermen. But upon error in the Exchequer Chamber, and, as
it isreported "uipontwo solemn arguments,"the judgment was
unanimously reversed. it was held that the words annuatim
elegendi in the charter were only directory, and that an annual
election of the aldermen was not necessary in order to make
the election of mayor good; and the court compared it to the
case of a constable and other annual officers who, it was said,
"are good officers after the year is out until another is elected
and sworn." On appeal to the House of Lords, this case was
argued by counsel no less eminent than Sir Philip Yorke, afterward Lord Hardwicke, against the validity of the election, and
by Lord Talbot in support of it. The House of Lords affirmed
the decision of the Exchequer Chamber, sustaining the opinion
that the aldermen held over. The question was never afterward agitated in the English courts. Foot v. Prowse settled
the principle as to offices held under a general direction to elect
annually. The Statute 11 Geo. I., passed while that case was
pending in the Lords, extended the principle to all corporate
qffices. In some of the States, the Statute 11 Geo. I. has been
re-enacted; but independently of that statute, the weight of
authority is in favor of the rule, so far at least as the English
decisions carried it. And Chancellor KENT, 2 Com. 296, indicates his opinion that the statute was but declaratory- of
the common law: People v. Rutn/cle, 9 Johns 157-8; Trustea
of Vernon Society v. Hill, 6 Cow. 23.
Returning now to the present case, I am of opinion that the
resolutions of 1825-6 and the practice of the general board
under them ought to be so construed as to preserve an unbroken
succession of cashiers qualified according to the requirement or
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the charter. Such a construction is quite consistent with the
language of the resolutions, is necessary in order to harmonize
them with the eighth fundamantal article of the charter, is supported by a reasonable presumption as to the intent of the
board, and moreover, it is in accordance with the effect given
at common law to like provisions in statutes and charters for
the election of civil and corporate officers. For it will be observed that the resolutions prescribe no term for the office of
cashier; as that it shall expire upon a day specified, or upon
the annual m'eeting of the board, or even upon an election
being held. They simply direct that a cashier be annually
elected-a provision quite within the common law principle
which extends the term of the incumbent until there shall be
a duly qualified succession in the office.
What then, we next inquire, is the effect upon Heston's term
of office and his official bonds under the elections of 1862 and
1865? The re-elections of Heston in 1863 and in 1864 were rendered ineffectual to create a new term of officeby his omission to
give bond pursuant to those elections, as required by the eighth
fundamental article. His term of office under the election of
1862 continued, until in 1865 he gave bond pursuant to his
re-election in that year. So the term of office commencing in
1865 continued until his removal in March, 1867, no official
bond having been meanwhile given. It follows that the liabilities of the sureties under each bond being co-extensive with
the term of office for which the bond was given, covered, under the two bonds, the whole period from the date of the bond
of 1862 until Heston's removal from office in 1867.
But here. we are met by an objection, argued with much
ability and force, that the bank is estopped from holding the
su'reties liable under either bond beyond a year from the election
pursuant to which the bond was given, and this upon the ground
that the sureties undertook for Heston under an expectation
that their liabilities would be limited strictly to the ensuing
year-an expectation induced by the very practice or usage on
the part of the bank of annually electing cashiers. And especially was it utged that the sureties ought not to suffer in consequence of the departure of the bank, after they became bound,
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from its previous practice of taking a new bond annually. 'This
is putting the objection in its strongest possible aspect.
The case lacks the essential feature necessary to entitle the
complainants to protection under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, or as it is usually termed, estoppel inpais. Assuming
that the sureties were induced to engage for Heston under the
expectation that his term was for a year only, and not to be
extended by the omission in the following year to elect or reelect and take new bond, still such misapprehension as to the
extent of the liability they were about to assume is not chargeable to the bank-. There is no proof of any misrepresentation
on the part of the bank or of its officers, nor of the withholding
of any information sought from it, or which, unsought, it was
its duty to give; nor (and here is the point of the objection)
was such misapprehension warranted by the practice or usage
of annual elections. For, in the first place, in the total absence
of evidence to the contrary, the sureties are presumed to have
understood the practice or usage according to its true construction and effect, that is, that although the office was in a general
sense an annual one, yet that the incumbent officer for whom
they were about to engage would hold over until the election
and qualification of a successor, or the re-election and qualifica.
tion anew of the incumbent. A mistake on this point cannot
be assumed when none appears in proof. But, in the next
place, if such mistake were shown to have existed, and to have
influenced the sureties to become such, still it does not appear
that they were denied by the bank access to its records or proceedings, or any information sought for in order to ascertain
the precise extent of the liability they were about to assume.
On the contrary, it must be considered that their mistake (if
such existed) was due to their own passiveness, caused by overconfidence in Heston, and not to any breach of duty on the
part of the bank. I now speak of the case as it stood at the
time the sureties became bound.
The subsequent omission of the bank to renpw the official
bond of the cashier on his re-election in 1863-4 and in 1866-7
may have been unfortunate; but the extension of the term of
office in consequence of an omission either to reelect or to quali ev
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the officer re-elected was one of the liabilities comprehended in
the obligation into which the sureties entered, which, in the
absence of proof, it must be presumed they understood; or even
if they did not so understand their engagement, their mistake
is chargeable to their own inattention and not to the bank.
We are now brought to inquire whether any defalcations
have occurred, and if so, to what Amount, within the period
of the sureties' liability under these bonds. * * *
1L We now come to the second general ground of relief
taken for the sureties, which is that the board of directors of
the branch bank neglected to supervise the accounts of the
bank, and to count its cash funds with such care and frequency
as would have led to the speedy detection of 4ny irregularity
or fraud, and so would have guarded both the bank and the
cashier's sureties against loss. Having, as is alleged, failed
to do so, it is urged that they are equitably estopped from
throwing upon the sureties a loss which but for their own
neglect would not have occurred.
This defense assumes as its basis that diligence on the part
of the bank-some degree of watchfulness over the cashier, his
transactions and accounts, was a duty on the part of the
directors-a duty not simply to the bank, whose agents they
were, but to these sureties-the performance of which was a
condition to the right of the bank to hold them liable. But
whence, it must be asked, arises any such duty on the part of
the bank toward the sureties? Clearly not out of the terms
of the bond; for by these the sureties undertake for Heston's
good behavior without any qualification-in effect, therefore,
undertaking absolutely and at all events. Nor does there
appear to have been any collateral engagement on the part of
the directors, or representations made to the sureties before
they entered, that any supervision would be exercised by the
directors. Though the existence of a by-law directing a periodical examination of accounts and count of funds is alleged in
thc bill, there was none such in fact. On the contrary, the
by-laws in force since 1835 charge upon the cashier alone the
entire responsibility for the correctness of all accounts and the
safety of the funds. We cannot then consider, in order to bring
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the sureties under the protection of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, that they entered into these bonds upon the faith of
a by-law or regulation requiring a supervision of the cashier,
or of some engagement or representation on the part of the
bank that such supervision would be exercised. As the case
presents itself, the sureties appear to have undertaken for
Heston relying on his integrity rather than upon the bank's
watchfulness, and submitting themselves to whatever may be
the legal responsibility of sureties, without seeking to qualify
it in their own case by any special conditions. Then it only
remains to add that under those rules of law, which, in the
absence of express stipulation, fix the responsibilities of sureties, is good faith and not diligence which is required of the
creditor as a condition of his right to hold the surety. (onmv-

ance on his part at the fraud of the principal, discharges the
sureties. But the creditor, or the obligee in a bond, is not
obliged, for the benefit of sureties, to watch the principal.
It is because it is really impracticable for this to be done effectually and at all times on the part of large institutions that
official bonds are required. To subject the responsibility of
sureties to so indefinite a question as whether due diligence
has been exercised by directors would render these securities
worthless. -Totheir value and usefulness it is essential that
the obligations assumed should be certain and absolute.
This distinction between the effect of fraud and of laches only
on the part of a creditor or obligee upon the liability of sureties
is clearly put in the U. S. v. Kirkpatrick,9 Wheat 720. That
was an action upon an official bond taken by the U. S. Government. The defense was neglect on the part of the collecting
officer of the Government to sue within the time prescribed
by law. The court, reasoning from what it considered an
undisputed rule in suretyships between private parties, says
"it is admitted that mere laches without fraud forms no dis.
charge of a contract of this nature between private individuals. Such is the clear result of authorities." The same
distinction has been applied to the case of sureties in a cashier's official bond in The State Bank v. Chetwood, 3 Halst 1,
and in 24ylor v. Bank of Kentucky, 2 J. J. Marshall 565.
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There is another principle quite well adjudged, which is
equally decisive against this defense of the sureties. It is
this: The obligation of the sureties being to the corporation,
i. e., to the stockholders by their corporate name, is not affected
by the acts or omissions of the directors of the branch bank,
who are themselves but servants of the corporation, and who,
though they exercise many important corporate powers, have
not authority to compromise or impair the official securities of
the corporation. This has been decided in two cases where
the directors, whose acts were called in question by sureties,
were directors of the bank to which the official bond was given,
and not of a branch bank: Afinor v. The Mechanics' Bank of
Alexandria, 1 Peters 46; Amherst Bank v-. Root, 2 Metcalf.
622. In another case, quite like the present one, this principle
was applied with the more force where the official bond was
given to the Bank of Kentucky, a parent bank, by the cashier
of one of its branches, and the defense was that the directors
of the branch bank had knowledge of the cashier's delinquencies
and connived at them. The defense was held insufficient:
Taylor v. The Bank of Kentucky, 2 J. J. Marshall 565. These
cases go so far as to hold that even a fraudulent combination
between the directors and cashier does not discharge the
cashier's sureties from their responsibility to the stockholders,
who are the corporation. It is difficult to see how this conclusion can be avoided, but the question does not arise here.
III. There remains a third and last ground of relief taken
for the sureties-that is, that under the statute barring suits
on official bonds after two years from the accruing of the cause
of action, the sureties are discharged as to so much of the defalcation as occurred more than two years previous to the
entering of judgment on the bonds, which was in March, 1867.
It will be observed here that two of the memorandum checks,
amounting together to $6,088.44, bear date, one September 5,
1866, the other January 15, 1867, both within two years next
before the entering of judgment on the bonds. We have seen
that the defalcations represented by these checks respectively,
must. in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be taken to
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have been committed at the date of the checks, and to these,
therefore, the statutory bar can have no application.
We then take up the check of December 1, 1864, for
$3,300.46. This sum was abstracted more than two years before the judgments were entered. Should the bank, on that
ground, be restrained from collecting this amount? I here
pass by one of the questions raised in'the argument, viz."
Whether Heston's failure on March 2, 1867, when his defalca.
tion was discovered, to pay over the sums he had taken, was of
itself a new breach of his official bond which gave the bank
two years from that date within which to proceed on the bond
for any defalcation committed while it was in. force. It is not
necessary to decide that question; for even supposing the abstraction of $3,300.46 on December 1, 1864, to be the only
breach of the bond as to that sum, still the bank is entitled to
collect it. Their equity to do so arises out of the fact that the defalcation was a fraud concealed from the bank, with respect to
which a court of equity will not permit the statutory bar to be set
up until the lapse of theprescribedterm after the discovery of the
fraud.

It is a settled and familiar principle that a court of equity
will not permit a party to make an unconscientious use of an
advantage gained at law. Hence it will deprive him of defenses when set up to protect fraud, though such defenses be
founded upon the most positive statutory enactments.
A familiar instance of this jurisdiction arises out of the
Statute of Frauds. Although this statute was intended absolutely to avoid parol contracts for interests in land, courts of
equity do not allow an unconscientious use of it, and therefore
it is that if a party has in part performed a parol contract for the
sale of lands, the statute shall not be set up against a bill seeking a complete performance. This court has long exercised the
same power to restrain an unconscientious use of the Statute
of Limitations. A very able vindication of this power, and
one now received as authoritative, is by Lord REDESDALD in
Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. and Lef. 431. The adjudged cases
afford many illustrations of the doctrine. In Putney v. Warren,
6 Ves. 73, it was applied by Lord ELDON to protect a party
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who had been prevented from pressing his remedy at law by
his adversary's carrying on an unfounded litigation in equity
until the statute had run. So in some cases where through
mistake a party has omitted to prosecute his rights in time,
equity has relieved against that statute, as in Brookshan7s v.
Smith, 2 Younge and Coll. 68 But most especially does equity
relieve against any attempt to us6 the statute as a cover for
fraud. In such case this court will even interfere in an action
at law to restrain a defendant from pleading the statute; a
fortiori will it refuse in the furtherance of fraud, to enforce
the statute by its own decree in a case which, like this, is
one of equitable jurisdiction. It treats the statute as running
firom the discovery of the fraud, not before.

There has been

controversy whether courts of Zaw can afford this relief against
the statute, but none whatever as to the power of a court of
equity: 2 Sto. Eq. Jur. 1521, 1521 a.; South Sea Co. v. Wymnondsell, 3 P.W.143 ; Delorainev. Bronme, 3 Bro. 0. 0. 633;
Booth v. Ld. Warrington, 4 Bro. P. C. 163.

There is nothing in the present case to except it from the
operation of the rule. It is true that equity will not relieve
against the bar of the statute in favor of a party who has been
in laches in not using means within his power to discover the
fraud. But a close supervision by large moneyed corporations
over their officers, sufficient to ensure the speedy detection of
fraud, is not practicable, and were it so, would become intolerable. These institutions must unavoidably trust their officers
and rest upon the official bond as the guaranty for their fidelity.
It is to this end that the bonds are taken. Their value would
be destroyed and their purpose defeated were it in the power
of a shrewd chashier to absolve himself and his sureties by
covering up his frauds for two years.
If the rules applied to this case seem to bear hardly upon
the sureties, it must be remembered that by these bonds they
undertook for the cashier's fidelity, absolutely and at al] events,
and engaged unconditionally to made good his defaults. They
had the power to limit their responsibility expressly to one
year or to make it subject to any conditions which might be
agreed upon. But this was not done. It would be a prudent

